Iran has been engaged in negotiations with mainly the West over its nuclear energy program since 2003. Talks between Iran and the EU3 (France, Germany, Britain), and later the P5+1 (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany), have led to the exchange of a number of proposals. Each document has contained a series of offers and demands, some of which have been accepted by both sides. However, no final agreement has come out so far. Efforts are still underway to find common ground that will result in a solution to the nuclear crisis. Below are outlines of the various proposals that have been exchanged over the years, and their outcomes.

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Tehran, October 2003

Overview

Negotiations begin between Iran and the EU3 (Britain, France, and Germany) over the Iranian nuclear energy program. In a meeting in Tehran, the two sides issue a statement known as the Tehran Declaration or Sa’dabad Agreement. The declaration is expected to open a new chapter of Iranian transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear technology in an effort to avoid referral of the Iranian nuclear file to the UN Security Council.

Tehran, October 2003

Lead Negotiators:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Text of October 2003 Tehran Declaration

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Full cooperation with the IAEA to address and resolve all outstanding issues
  • Signing and immediate implementation of the Additional Protocol
  • Voluntary suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities

Demands made by Iran

  • Recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with the NPT

Offers made by EU3

  • Recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with the NPT
  • Assurance of Iran’s access to modern technology and supplies
  • Cooperation with Iran on promoting security and stability in the region
  • Cooperation with Iran on the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East

Demands made by EU3

  • Full Iranian cooperation with the IAEA to resolve outstanding concerns
  • Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol
  • Iran’s suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities

Outcome

Iran agrees to co-operate with the IAEA as well as sign and implement the Additional Protocol as a voluntary and confidence-building measure. Additionally, Iran agrees to voluntarily and temporarily suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities while negotiations are underway. In exchange, the EU3 agrees to recognize “the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT” and promises long-term cooperation in various fields.

Brussels, February 2004

Overview

Four months after the signing of the Tehran Declaration, Iran and the three European governments (Britain, France, and Germany) sign another agreement – this time in the Belgian capital. In the deal, which comes to be known as the Brussels Agreement, Iran’s nuclear negotiating team agrees in principle to accept suspension of enrichment as defined by the IAEA. In return, the EU3 make a commitment to work actively to normalize relations between Iran and the IAEA. The Europeans also pledge to do their best to close Iran’s nuclear file in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2004.

Brussels, February 2004

Lead Negotiators:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

Key points

Iran’s Commitments

  • Suspension of manufacturing and assembling of centrifuge parts
  • Full cooperation with the IAEA
  • Implementation of the Additional Protocol
  • Provision of long-term guarantees regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear energy program

EU3 Commitments

  • Recognition of that what Iran has declared is within the framework of IAEA safeguards
  • Closing of Iran’s file in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June 2004
  • Construction of light water power station in Iran

Outcome

As promised, Iran expands its suspension of enrichment to include a halt to the manufacturing and assembling of centrifuge parts. However, the EU3 violates its commitments. It doesn’t normalize relations between Iran and the IAEA. Most importantly, the June meeting isn’t used to close Iran’s nuclear file. Instead, Western powers propose a harsh resolution with further demands in the Board of Governors meeting. In response, Iran ends its suspension of manufacturing and assembling of centrifuge parts, which went into effect in mid-April.

Paris, November 2004

Overview

In November 2004, representatives from Iran and the EU3 sign an agreement on ways to move forward. The objective of the deal, signed in the French capital Paris, is to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements. The accord, which comes to be known as the Paris Agreement, provides objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear energy program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It also provides guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation as well as commitments on security issues.

Paris, November 2004

Lead Negotiators:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Text of November 2004 Paris Agreement

Key points

Iran’s Commitments

  • Reaffirmation that it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons
  • Commitment to transparency and full cooperation with the IAEA
  • Continued voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol pending ratification by parliament
  • Voluntary continuation and expansion of its suspension to include all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities for the duration of EU-Iran negotiations
  • The extension covers the manufacturing, installation, testing, and operation of gas centrifuges. It also prohibits separation of plutonium or construction of a plutonium-separation facility

EU3 Commitments

  • Recognition of Iran’s rights under the NPT
  • Recognition that Iran’s enrichment suspension is a voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation
  • Support for Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)

Joint Commitments

  • Iran, EU3 reaffirm their commitment to the NPT
  • Iran, EU3 to begin negotiations on long-term arrangements
  • Iran, EU3 to cooperate in combatting terrorism, including activities of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as the MKO

Outcome

Iran agrees to voluntarily continue and expand its temporary suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities to include manufacturing and assembling of centrifuge parts.

Geneva, January 2005

Overview

Following the signing of the Paris Agreement, the two sides continue to hold negotiations. In accordance with the Paris accord, senior officials from Iran and the EU3 are mandated by their working groups to make an assessment of the progress they have achieved. During the course of these negotiations, Iran presents four proposals, the first of which is tabled in January 2005 and presented to the EU3/Iran Political and Security Working Group in Geneva. The document outlines general commitments on both sides.

Geneva, January 2005

Lead Negotiators:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Iran’s January 2005 proposal to Political & Security Working Group

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Commitment to not pursue Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
  • Adoption of measures to prevent unauthorized access to its nuclear capabilities and enrichment technology by any individual, group or state and uncontrolled export to other states

Demands made by Iran

  • EU3/EU rejection of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Iran
  • EU3/EU rejection of any direct or indirect attack or sabotage or threats thereof against Iranian nuclear facilities
  • EU3/EU reaffirmation of the inherent right of Iran to acquire legitimate means for self-defense
  • EU3/EU removal of restrictions and provision of military, police and border control assistance to enhance Iran’s counter-terrorism and drug enforcement capacities

Joint commitments proposed by Iran

  • Iran and EU3/EU cooperation on fight against terrorism
  • Iran and EU3/EU cooperation on regional security including Iraq and Afghanistan
  • Iran and EU3/EU cooperation on strategic trade controls
  • Iran and EU3/EU cooperation on elimination and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Outcome

The EU3 does not consider the Iranian proposal and instead tries to permanently end Iran's enrichment-related activities.

Paris, March 2005

Overview

In March 2005, Iran presents a new proposal, this time to the EU3/Iran steering committee. The package offers a collection of solutions for “objective guarantees” that is suggested by various independent scientists and observers from the United States and Europe. In the proposal, Iran provides further detail of the guarantees it is willing to offer over its nuclear energy program.

Paris, March 2005

Lead Negotiators:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Iran’s proposal at March 2005 meeting of Steering Committee

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Ratification of the Additional Protocol
  • Relinquishing of plutonium reprocessing
  • Adoption of a “Policy Declaration” limiting its enrichment to an agreed amount and level
  • Storing of all low-enriched uranium (LEU) in the form of proliferation-resistant fuel rods
  • Allowing of the continuous, on-site presence of IAEA inspectors in its facilities

Demands made by Iran

  • EU recognition of Iran’s right to nuclear technology
  • EU commitment to building nuclear power plants in Iran
  • EU provision of guarantees on the supply of fuel to these reactors
  • EU guarantee of Iran’s access to EU markets
  • EU recognition of Iran as a major source of energy supply for Europe
  • EU guarantee of Iran’s access to advanced and nuclear technology
  • EU launch of initiative to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East

Outcome

The offer is met with rejection by the European side, which shows no desire to review the proposal and instead tries to permanently end Iran's enrichment-related activities.

London, April 2005

Overview

In April 2005, Iran presents another proposal to the EU3/Iran steering committee. The document builds on the proposal presented by Iran in March and includes new provisions. It focuses mainly on short-term confidence-building measures rather than long-term resolutions. It also suggests the negotiated resumption of work at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), at low capacity and with additional surveillance and monitoring measures.

London, April 2005

Lead Negotiators:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of European Union
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Iran’s proposal at April 2005 meeting of Steering Committee

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Continuation and intensification of negotiations in good faith
  • Implementation of the commitments of its March proposal
  • Adoption of the Additional Protocol
  • Continuation of its enrichment suspension for six months
  • Allowing of continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the Esfahan UCF
  • Cooperation in establishing a joint task force on counter-terrorism and export controls

Demands made by Iran

  • EU3 recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology
  • EU3 guarantee of Iran’s access to EU markets
  • EU3 recognition of Iran as a major source of energy supply for Europe

Outcome

The proposal is rejected by the EU3.

Tehran, July 2005

Overview

In an effort to salvage the faltering negotiations, Iran’s then chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani sends a message to the foreign ministers of the EU3 countries. In his message, Rouhani offers a flexible solution to the situation, as the EU3 finalize their own package.

Tehran, July 2005

Lead Counterparts:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Dominique de Villepin: Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Rouhani’s July 2005 letter to EU3 Foreign Ministers

Key points

Iran’s proposal

  • Negotiations on commencement of work at the Esfahan UCF at low capacity
  • Full-scope monitoring at the Esfahan UCF
  • Agreement on the import of feed material for UCF and export of the product
  • Negotiations on the launch of initial and full-scale operations at Natanz
  • Negotiations on an “optimized” IAEA monitoring mechanism for Natanz
  • Synchronization of Natanz scale with fuel requirements of reactors offered by EU or Russia

Outcome

The offer is rejected by the EU3 with no consideration at political levels.

Brussels, August 2005

Overview

Nine months after the signing of the Paris agreement, the EU3 presents its first proposal to Iran. The package, entitled “Framework for a Long-Term Agreement”, offers Iran vague incentives and in return makes heavy demands. The package does not recognize Iran's right to enrichment. It also asks Iran to not pursue uranium enrichment or other nuclear fuel-making technologies for at least 10 years.

Brussels, August 2005

Lead Counterparts:

Hassan Rouhani Born in 1948. PhD in Constitutional Law : Secy. of Supreme Nat’l Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of European Union
Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom
Philippe Douste-Blazy: Minister of Foreign Affairs of France
Joschka Fischer: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

pdf Text of EU3′s August 2005 proposal to Iran

Key points

Offers made by the EU3

  • Provision of an assured supply of low-enriched uranium to Iran
  • Recognition of Iran as a long-term source of fossil fuel energy
  • Cooperation with Iran on a variety of political and security issues in the region
  • Continued support for Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)

Demands made by the EU3

  • Iran should abstain from pursuing fuel-cycle technologies for at least 10 years
  • Iran must continue cooperation with the IAEA, with all facilities under safeguards under all circumstances
  • Iran should adopt an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement
  • Iran should give a legally binding commitment to not leave the NPT
  • Iran should agree to receive its needed nuclear fuel from a third country
  • Iran should return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries

Outcome

Iran rejects the proposal, saying it illustrates the EU3’s total abandonment of the Paris Agreement; an accusation mirrored by the Europeans. Tehran describes the package as demeaning and incommensurate with Iran and its vast capabilities, potentials and requirements. As a result, Iran informs the IAEA that it will end the suspension of operations at the UCF facility in Esfahan.

New York, September 2005

Overview

On September 17th 2005, then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad makes a far-reaching offer of added guarantees in his address before the UN General Assembly. The centerpiece of his speech is an invitation to international partnership in Iran’s enrichment activities. While President Ahmadinejad reiterates that Iran’s right to nuclear fuel cycle technology is not negotiable, he presents a series of confidence-building positions and proposals.

New York, September 2005

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Born in 1956. PhD in Transportation Engineering & Planning , President of I.R of Iran

pdf Text of Ahmadinejad’s September 2005 speech at UNGA

Key points

  • Readiness for constructive interaction and a just dialog in good faith
  • Prohibition of pursuit of nuclear weapons in accordance with religious principles
  • Necessity to revitalize the NPT
  • Cooperation with the IAEA as the centerpiece of Iran’s nuclear policy
  • Readiness to continue negotiations with the EU3
  • Readiness to consider various proposals that have been presented
  • Welcoming of the proposal of South Africa to move the process forward
  • Acceptance of partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of a uranium enrichment program in Iran which engages other countries directly and removes any concerns

Tehran/Vienna, June-August 2006

Overview

In June 2006, China, Russia, and the United States join the EU3 in offering Iran a new proposal for comprehensive negotiations. The proposal made by the group, now known as the P5+1 as it is made up of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, it is largely similar to the EU3’s proposal in August 2005. The document again requires Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities as a precondition for further, more detailed negotiations. High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana, travels to Tehran to deliver the proposal.

Vienna, June 2006

Lead Counterparts:

Ali Larijani Born in 1958. PhD in Western Philosophy : Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union

pdf Text of P5+1′s June 2006 proposal to Iran

Key points

Offers made by P5+1

  • Suspension of discussion of Iran’s nuclear energy program in the UN Security Council
  • Provision of light water reactors to Iran through joint projects
  • Provision of nuclear fuel guarantees and a 5-year stock of fuel to Iran
  • Cooperation with Iran on civil aviation, telecommunications, high-technology, agriculture and other areas

Demands made by P5+1

  • Iran must suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
  • Iran must resume implementation of the Additional Protocol
  • Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA

Outcome

Iran responds to the proposal in August 2006, rejecting its terms including the proposed enrichment freeze as a precondition for further negotiations. However, Tehran notes that the proposal does contain useful foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two sides.

Tehran, May 2008

Overview

In May 2008, Iran sends a letter to UN officials accompanied by an offer of constructive negotiations.

Tehran, May 2008

Lead Counterparts:Manouchehr Mottaki Born in 1953. MA in International Relations : Minister of Foreign Affairs of I.R. of Iran
Ban Ki-moon: Secretary-General of the United Nations

pdf Text of Iran’s May 2008 letter to UN officials

Key points

Iran’s proposal

  • Improved IAEA supervision of the nuclear activities of various states
  • Establishment of enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world – including in Iran
  • Cooperation to access and utilize peaceful nuclear technology and facilitating its usage by all states
  • Joint collaboration on nuclear safety
  • Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues

Outcome

The P5+1 says it will present a revised proposal in a month’s time.

Tehran/Geneva, June-August 2008

Overview

In June 2008, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana travels to Tehran to hand over an updated package of incentives on behalf of the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus Germany.) The package is a revised version of the P5+1 proposal that had been presented to Iran in 2006. It again asks Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program by calling for a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” period. In other words, it is suggested that Iran agree to freeze its enrichment program in exchange for a pledge by the P5+1 to not pursue additional sanctions. The package fails to recognize Iran’s nuclear rights and offers it economic incentives instead.

New York, June 2008

Lead Counterparts:

Saeed Jalili Born in 1965. PhD in Political Science : Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Mark Lyall-Grant: Dir. of Pol. Affairs Dept of the Foreign Office of the UK
Gerard Araud: Dir.-Gen. for Political Affairs at Foreign Ministry of France
Volker Stanzel: Dir. of Pol. Affairs Dept of Foreign Ministry of Germany
Liu Jieyi: Assistant Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China
Sergei Kislyak: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
William Burns: Under Secretary of State of the USA

pdf Text of P5+1′s June 2008 proposal to iran
pdf Text of Iranian non-paper presented at July 2008 meeting in Geneva

Key points

Offers made by P5+1

  • Assisting Iran in the construction of light water reactors
  • Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees to Iran
  • Cooperation with Iran on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste
  • Improving of direct dialogue between Iran and the P5+1
  • Promotion of cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan; especially on drug trafficking
  • Promotion of Iran’s constructive role in international affairs
  • Assisting Iran in economic, social and human development projects
  • Supporting Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization

Demands made by P5+1

  • Iran must suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing

Outcome

Iran responds to the package by issuing a non-paper at a follow-up meeting in Geneva in July 2008. In the document, Tehran proposes holding further negotiations based on the commonalities of the packages that had been presented by Iran and the P5+1 in May and June. In August 2008, Iran sends a two-page letter to Solana, saying it’s ready to provide a clear response to the P5+1’s proposal, while waiting for a clear response to its questions as well. Tehran, however, makes no commitments on a temporary suspension of enrichment. The United States dismisses the Iranian initiative and calls for increased sanctions.

Tehran, September 2009

Overview

After the election in November 2008 of Barack Obama as US President, the P5+1 seeks to renew negotiations with Iran. The group issues a statement in April 2009 in which it welcomes what it calls the new direction of US policy towards Iran, and invites Tehran back to the negotiating table. Iran responds to the invitation in September 2009 by presenting a new package of proposals to the P5+1 which it says addresses various global issues. The package, entitled ‘Cooperation for Peace, Justice and Progress’, calls for cooperation on political-security, international, and economic issues.

September 2009

Lead Counterparts:

Saeed Jalili Born in 1965. PhD in Political Science : Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union

pdf Text of Iran’s September 2009 package of proposals to P5+1

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and piracy
  • Full-scope monitoring at the Esfahan UCF
  • Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function
  • Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation
  • Reform in the UN and Security Council

Geneva, October 2009

Overview

In early October 2009, the IAEA presents a draft agreement that calls for a third country to further enrich most of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to below five percent and turn it into reactor fuel. The proposal comes after Iran’s June 2009 request for the IAEA’s assistance with refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which runs on uranium enriched to 19.75%. The US-supplied facility, which produces medical isotopes used in the treatment of some 800,000 Iranians, is running out of fuel. Soon afterwards, high-level discussions are held between Iran, the US, Russia, France and the IAEA to determine further details. Based on the final proposal, Iran is asked to ship out 1,200 kilograms of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia by the end of the year. This amount equals some 70 percent of Iran’s LEU stockpile (at the time). After further enrichment in Russia, it is suggested that France turn the enriched uranium into fuel rods. Tehran is promised that it will receive a supply of 120 kilograms of fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor one year after the signing of the deal (i.e. at the end of 2010).

Geneva, October 2009

Lead Negotiators:

Saeed Jalili Born in 1965. PhD in Political Science : Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Javier Solana: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Mark Lyall-Grant: Director of Political Affairs Dept of FO of the UK
Jacques Audibert: Director-General for Political Affairs at MFA of France
Volker Stanzel: Director of Political Affairs Dept of MFA of Germany
Cheng Jingye: Director-General of Arms Control of MFA of PR of China
Sergei Ryabkov: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
William Burns: Under Secretary of State of the USA

pdf Outline of proposed October 2009 nuclear fuel swap

Key points

The TRR fuel swap proposal emphasized the following points

  • Iran must ship out 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of 2009
  • Russia will enrich Iranian LEU to 19.75 percent and send it to France for conversion into fuel plates
  • France will produce the fuel plates for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement
  • The US will work with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR
  • Iran will receive about 120 kilograms of fuel containing 19.75 percent-enriched uranium for the TRR

Outcome

At an initial meeting held in Geneva on October 1, Iran agrees “in principle” to the nuclear fuel swap. Later, Tehran says it needs “100 percent guarantees” that it will indeed receive the reactor fuel. On several occasions, Iran proposes that the two elements of the fuel exchange occur simultaneously on its soil or that the two sides carry out the swap in smaller batches. The P5+1 rejects Iran’s proposals, leading to the collapse of the fuel swap initiative.

Tehran, May 2010

Overview

After the failure of the fuel swap talks in Geneva, US President Barack Obama sends his Brazilian counterpart a letter in which he encourages a Turkish-Brazilian effort to revive the proposal. Brazil’s president and Turkey’s prime minister travel to Tehran for intense discussions. In the end, the three countries (Iran, Brazil and Turkey) sign a joint declaration on Iran’s exchange of low-enriched uranium for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. The document is referred to as the Tehran Declaration (not to be confused with the Tehran Declaration of 2003.) The terms of the agreement are practically identical to the failed October 2009 proposal. Iran agrees to ship 1,200 kilograms of LEU to Turkey for a later exchange of 120kg of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.

Tehran, May 2010

Lead Negotiators:

Manouchehr Mottaki Born in 1953. MA in International Relations : Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.R. of Iran
Ahmet Davutoglu: Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
Celso Amorim: Minister of External Relations of Brazil
pdf Text of Obama’s April 2010 letter to Lula da Silva
pdf Text of May 2010 Tehran Declaration

Key points

Main points of Iran-Turkey-Brazil agreement

  • The three countries recognize Iran’s right to develop, produce and use peaceful nuclear energy (including enrichment activities)
  • Iran will send 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey
  • Iran will receive 120 kg of nuclear fuel rods, within one year, from the so-called Vienna Group (which is comprised of the US, Russia, France and the IAEA)
  • Iran will only use the fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor
  • If the Vienna Group fails to live up to its part of the agreement, Turkey will transfer the LEU back to Iran (which maintains legal possession of the material)

Outcome

The Tehran Declaration is immediately rejected by the US, which pushes for a fourth round of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran the month after. Washington’s rejection of the agreement comes despite President Obama’s letter to his Brazilian counterpart, in which he said Iran’s agreement to export 1,200 kilograms of LEU “would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile.”

Moscow, July 2011

Overview

In July 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov presents a step-by-step plan to restart talks between Iran and the West. Based on the proposal, Iran is requested to take a series of measures to address international questions over its nuclear energy program and receive a gradual easing of sanctions in return.

Moscow, July 2011

Sergei Lavrov: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia

The proposal entails the following points

Step 1

  • Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and halts the production of advanced centrifuges
  • The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship inspections

Step 2

  • Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps its enrichment level at 5 percent, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its centrifuges
  • The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions

Step 3

  • Iran implements the Additional Protocol
  • The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner

Step 4

  • Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months
  • The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed incentives

Key points

Proposed Iranian Commitments

  • Allow greater monitoring by the IAEA
  • Agreement to provide early design information to the IAEA
  • Agreement to implement the Additional Protocol
  • Eventual suspension of all enrichment-related activities for three months

Proposed P5+1 Commitments

  • Gradual lifting of all sanctions against Iran

Outcome

Although some P5+1 members don’t support the proposal in its existing format, none express any public opposition. The US says it will study the proposal. Iran, on the other hand, publicly welcomes the offer. However, Tehran too, says it will need several months to study the document.

Istanbul/Baghdad/Moscow, April/May/June 2012

Overview

After an extended hiatus, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resume in Istanbul in April 2012. The two sides decide to adopt a step-by-step process with reciprocal actions in order to move toward a long-term solution. Amid a positive atmosphere, there is agreement on holding another meeting in Baghdad in May. In the Iraqi capital, the P5+1 presents a new proposal. The package is an updated version of the 2009 fuel swap plan presented to Iran by the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA.) The proposal is referred to as “stop-shut-ship” in media. It asks Iran to stop enriching uranium to 19.75 percent, shut down operations at Fordow (where some of this level of enrichment is taking place.), and ship all of its stockpile of such material to a third country. In exchange, the P5+1 offers to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, cooperate with Iran on the construction of a research reactor capable of producing medical isotopes, and provide spare parts for civilian planes. The offer does not include any sanctions relief or recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment under the NPT. The two sides agree to meet again in Moscow in June. In the Russian capital, Iran proposes a five-step plan which addresses a broad range of issues, from a commitment to not pursue any nuclear weapons, provision of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor and cooperation on security and international issues.

Istanbul/Baghdad/Moscow, April/May/June 2012

Lead Negotiators

Saeed Jalili Born in 1965. PhD in Political Science : Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Catherine Ashton: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Geoffrey Adams: Director of Political Affairs Dept of FO of the UK
Jacques Audibert: Director-General for Political Affairs at MFA of France
Hans-Dieter Lucas: Director of Political Affairs Dept of MFA of Germany
Le Yucheng: Assistant Foreign Minister of PR of China/
Ma Zhaoxu: Assistant Foreign Minister of PR of China(from May 2012)
Sergei Ryabkov: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Wendy Sherman: Under Secretary of State of the USA

pdf Iran’s Powerpoint presentation at June 2012 talks in Moscow
pdf Details of Iran’s proposal presented in July 2012 technical talks

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Emphasis on commitments under the NPT and opposition to nuclear weapons based on Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa
  • Continuation of cooperation with the IAEA within the framework of Iran’s legal and safeguards obligations
  • Cooperation with the P5+1 to provide fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor
  • Cooperation with the P5+1 in the fields of nuclear energy production and nuclear safety
  • Cooperation with the P5+1 in combating piracy and counter-narcotics activities
  • Cooperation with the P5+1 in economic, political, security and international issues
  • Readiness to accept confidence-building measures

Demands made by Iran

  • P5+1 recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights, and especially its enrichment activities, based on Article IV of the NPT
  • P5+1 termination of all unilateral and multilateral sanctions
  • P5+1 removal of Iran’s nuclear file from the UN Security Council
  • P5+1 assistance with designing and building nuclear power plants and research reactors
  • P5+1 cooperation with Iran on regional issues, and especially Syria & Bahrain
  • P5+1 cooperation with Iran on economic, political, security and international issues

Demands made by the P5+1

  • Iran must stop producing uranium enriched to 19.75 percent
  • Iran must transfer all 19.75 percent-enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody
  • Iran must shut down its Fordow facility

Offers made by the P5+1

  • P5+1 will provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor
  • P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the Tehran Research Reactor
  • P5+1 will provide spare parts for Iran’s fleet of civilian airliners
  • P5+1 will cooperate with Iran in building a light water research reactor for producing medical isotopes

Outcome

Iran does not accept the P5+1’s proposal, while the P5+1 does not address Iran’s proposal. The two sides agree to a technical-level meeting in Istanbul on July 3rd to discuss details of their proposals.

Almaty, February/April 2013

Overview

Iran and the P5+1 meet twice in Kazakhstan in early 2013 to continue negotiations. The first round of talks is held in February (Almaty I), and the second round in April (Almaty II). The package presented by the P5+1 during these talks is largely similar to the one it produced in 2012. However, there are some alterations. The new proposal allows Iran to keep part of its 19.75 percent stockpile, which it needs for medical purposes. Moreover, while not calling for an outright shutdown of Fordow, it demands alterations at the site which would be tantamount to a shutdown. The proposal offers some sanctions relief in the trade of gold, precious metals and petrochemicals in exchange for these Iranian measures. Iran issues a counter-proposal at the second day of the Almaty II talks. Iran says it will agree to suspend its enrichment of uranium to 19.75 percent. It also says it will continue converting its stockpile of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas enriched to 19.75% to oxide (the form required to make reactor fuel.) In return, Iran demands full recognition of its right to nuclear technology – including enrichment - as well as the lifting of some of the sanctions on its banking sector.

Istanbul/Baghdad/Moscow, April/May/June 2012

Lead Negotiators

Saeed Jalili Born in 1965. PhD in Political Science : Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of I.R. of Iran
Catherine Ashton: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Simon Gass: Director of Political Affairs Dept of FO of the UK
Jacques Audibert: Director-General for Political Affairs at MFA of France
Hans-Dieter Lucas: Director of Political Affairs Dept of MFA of Germany
Ma Zhaoxu: Assistant Foreign Minister of PR of China
Sergei Ryabkov: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Wendy Sherman: Under Secretary of State of the USA

pdf Text of P5+1′s 2013 proposal in Almaty

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Freeze on installation of centrifuges at Fordow
  • Continuation of talks with the IAEA
  • Continuation of conversion of 19.75 percent-enriched uranium hexafluoride (gas) to oxide
  • Suspension of enrichment of uranium to 19.75 percent

Demands made by Iran

  • P5+1 must lift all sanctions against Iran
  • P5+1 must recognize Iran’s nuclear rights under the NPT

Offers made by P5+1

  • Provision of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor
  • Cooperation on provision of medical isotopes and nuclear medicines
  • Pledge to not pursue new proliferation-related UN Security Council sanctions or proliferation-related EU sanctions
  • Suspension of sanctions on Iranian trade in gold, precious metals and petrochemicals
  • Cooperation on Iran’s acquisition of a light water research reactor for producing medical isotopes

Demands made by P5+1

  • Iran must suspend all activities related to enrichment to 19.75 percent
  • Iran must transfer part of its 19.75 percent-enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody
  • Iran should halt all operations at Fordow
  • Iran should fully cooperate with the IAEA
  • Iran should commit to the Additional Protocol

Outcome

Proposals are exchanged during the April negotiations, but no consensus is reached on how to move forward.

Geneva, October 2013

Overview

After his election as president in June 2013, Hassan Rouhani appoints new Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as chief nuclear negotiator. Zarif and his team hold their first round of talks with the P5+1 in Geneva on October 15th-16th. A new Iranian proposal, entitled “An End to an Unnecessary Crisis, Opening a New Horizon”, is presented by Zarif in the first session. Afterwards, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi leads the negotiations on the Iranian side, as Zarif retreats to his hotel. Rouhani had emphasized a preference for the level of political representation in the nuclear talks to be elevated, fueling media speculations that Zarif won’t directly participate in actual negotiations until the level of P5+1 representation is elevated.

Geneva, October 2013

Lead Negotiators

Mohammad Javad Zarif Born in 1960. PhD in International Law and Policy : Minister of Foreign Affairs of I.R. of Iran
Catherine Ashton: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Simon Gass: Director of Political Affairs Dept of FO of the UK
Jacques Audibert: Director-General for Political Affairs at MFA of France
Hans-Dieter Lucas: Director of Political Affairs Dept of MFA of Germany
Pang Sen: Director-General of Arms Control of MFA of PR of China
Sergei Ryabkov: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Wendy Sherman: Under Secretary of State of the USA

Outcome

After the negotiations in Geneva in October, the two sides agree to keep the content of the Iranian proposal confidential, pending an agreement. After issuing a joint statement emphasizing the new atmosphere, the two sides agree to meet again in Geneva on November 7th-8th.

Geneva, November (7-10) 2013

Geneva, November 2013

Lead Negotiators

Mohammad Javad Zarif Born in 1960. PhD in International Law and Policy : Minister of Foreign Affairs of I.R. of Iran
Catherine Ashton: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Simon Gass: Director of Political Affairs Dept of FO of the UK
William Hague: Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs of the UK (from Nov 8th)
Jacques Audibert: Director-General for Political Affairs at MFA of France
Laurant Fabius: MFEA of France (from Nov 8th)
Guido Westerwelle: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany
Hans-Dieter Lucas: Director of Political Affairs Dept of MFA of Germany
Pang Sen: Director-General of Arms Control of MFA of PR of China
Li Baodong: Vice Foreign Minister of PR of China (from Nov 9th)
Sergei Ryabkov: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Sergei Lavrov: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (from Nov 9th)
Wendy Sherman: Under Secretary of State of the USA
John Kerry: Secretary of State of State of the USA (from Nov 8th)

Outcome

Clear divisions emerge among the P5+1 on the final day of the talks. France says it cannot accept the draft text presented by Iran. The talks wrap up just after midnight on Saturday, after having officially entered their fourth day. No deal is announced. All sides, however, stress that differences have narrowed and agree to resume negotiations in 10 days, but on a lower level.

Geneva, November (20-24) 2013

Overview

In the early morning hours of Sunday November 24th, Iran and the P5+1 (US, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia) finally manage to overcome their differences and reach a preliminary six-month agreement on Tehran’s nuclear energy program. The deal, known as the Joint Plan of Action, is signed after more than four days of intense negotiations and under strong pressure from Israel and conservative lobby groups. The agreement details initial steps which lay out the goal of reaching a final comprehensive solution and follows the principle of “nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.”

Geneva, November 2013

Lead Negotiators

Mohammad Javad Zarif Born in 1960. PhD in International Law and Policy : Minister of Foreign Affairs of I.R. of Iran
Catherine Ashton: High Representative for CFSP of the European Union
Simon Gass: Director of Political Affairs Dept of FO of the UK
William Hague: Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs of the UK (from Nov 23rd)
Jacques Audibert: Director-General for Political Affairs at MFA of France
Laurant Fabius: MFEA of France (from Nov 8th)
Guido Westerwelle: Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany
Hans-Dieter Lucas: Director of Political Affairs Dept of MFA of Germany
Pang Sen: Director-General of Arms Control of MFA of PR of China
Wang Yi: Foreign Minister of PR of China (from Nov 23rd)
Sergei Ryabkov: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Sergei Lavrov: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (from Nov 23rd)
Wendy Sherman: Under Secretary of State of the USA
John Kerry: Secretary of State of State of the USA (from Nov 23rd)
pdf Text of Geneva Deal

Key points

Offers made by Iran

  • Voluntary suspension of enrichment activities beyond 5 percent
  • Agreement to halt most operations at the Arak Heavy Water facility
  • Agreement to enhanced monitoring of facilities at Natanz, Fordow and Arak
  • Agreement to voluntarily freeze its enrichment capacity by not installing more centrifuges

Demands made by Iran

  • Recognition of its right to enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes
  • Lifting of all UNSC, multilateral and unilateral sanctions
  • Normalization of its file where Iran’s nuclear energy program is treated in the same manner as that of any NPT member state

Offers made by P5+1

  • Recognition of Iran’s right to have a nuclear energy program for peaceful purposes
  • Partial repatriation of Iranian oil export revenues held abroad and pausing efforts to further reduce Iran’s oil sales
  • Suspension of US and EU sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports as well as sanctions on gold and precious metals
  • Suspension of US sanctions on Iran’s auto industry
  • Licensing the supply and installation of spare parts for Iran’s civilian airplanes
  • Prevention of further UN Security Council and EU sanctions against Iran. The US will refrain from imposing new sanctions on Iran
  • Establishment of a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad

Demands made by P5+1

  • Iran must reaffirm that it will never seek or develop nuclear weapons
  • Iran must suspend all enrichment activities beyond 5 percent
  • Iran must dilute its 19.75 percent enriched uranium stockpile or convert it to oxide
  • Iran must not increase its stockpile of low-enriched uranium
  • Iran must halt most operations at the Arak Heavy Water facility
  • Iran must not expand its activities at Natanz, Fordow and Arak
  • Iran must not add any new locations for enrichment purposes
  • Iran must not engage in reprocessing activities and refrain from constructing any facilities capable of doing so
  • Iran must agree to enhanced monitoring and IAEA inspections

Outcome

Under the deal, Iran agrees to stop enriching uranium beyond 5 percent and dilute or convert to oxide existing stockpiles of uranium enriched to 19.75 percent. Tehran also agrees to not install any new centrifuges or expand its nuclear facilities as well as allow close monitoring by IAEA inspectors. In return, Iran is allowed access to $4.2 billion of its funds frozen abroad in addition to some sanctions relief. EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton says the interim deal is aimed at providing time and space so a “comprehensive solution” can be reached. As part of the agreement, a Joint Commission consisting of Iran and the P5+1 is established to monitor the implementation of the deal and work with the IAEA to verify nuclear-related measures.